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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
1~1 1 :X:'\ETrr

:\IO'I'OR CO:\IPANY,
Plaintiff-AppellantJ
vs.

:\li\.1-tl\: L. L \TON, THE 'l,RA 'TEL-

EllS INSURANCE CO:\IJ->.l\NY, )
a corporation,
DefendantsJ

Case No.
9680

lTXI'fED S T r\ T E S FIDELITY
.~.\ND GUr\RANTY CO~IP r\.N\T,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff-appellant has asked this Court to set
aside l~.,indings of Fact and Conclusions of La\v on
notice of cancellation to the plaintiff because of failure
of the eYidence of respondent LT.S.F.&G. Respondent
does not argue that point and admits that the la"T is
contained in appellant's cases; but subtnits the matter
to the l_,ourt on t'vo issues of construction of documents
and the consequent issues of la"· raised thereby.
1
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The first of respondent's issues relates to liability,
and the second to claim of release because of loss of
subrogation rights.

''r

POINT I. THE INSURER
AS LIABLE
TO 'l,HE PLAIN'l,I~,F LIENHOLDER.
Respondent's argument emphasizes "direct and
accidental loss" from the policy language, and appellant
has argued that the langauge of the loss payable clause
prevents escape from liability due to any act or neglect
of the owner.
The parties agree that this was a ''standard or
union" loss payable clause \vhich created a new contract
between the lienholder and the insurer, making inapplicable the cases under the usual "as its interest may
appear'' or open clause under "Thich the lienholder's
right is derivative from the insured owner's right.
There are two fundamental differences in the positions of the parties here :
Respondent contends that if a loss is not "direct
and accidental" as to the o'Yner, it cannot be "direct
and accidental" as to the lienholder. (Resp. Brief, page
12-14).
Rsepondent also argues that the only occasion for
exclusion of en1bezzle1nent and conYersion in the loss
payable clause is in the eyent CoYerage G of the policy
has been taken (Resp. Brief page 1.t) ; appellant contends that the exclusion is put in the loss payable clause
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to tnakc plain that if Co,·erage D is taken in the policy
there is no liabilitr to the mortgagee or lienholder for
ctnbezzletnent, eon,·ersion and secretion unless Coverage
(; is also taken.
l{espotHlent attempts to give a special meaning to
·~direct and aecidental/' which cannot be supported from
the policy or frotn its cases.
Respondent's cases at page 9 of its brief are not
in point. Only t"ro of them, I...~ewis and Wong, discuss
the Ineaning of "direct and accidental loss." And in
both of those cases, the action was brought by the person
eonunitting the destruction. '"fhe cases hold pritnarily
that one \vho intentionally destroys insured property
cannot recover for the loss from the insurer. Lewis is an
action by tnortgagee under an ordinary clause; Fedele,
Il ary rove, 0 ri e nt I nsu ran cc, and Chaachou are actions
by O\\·ners \vhose O\\'n \vrongs defeated recovery; and
in TJTong. Bellman, Jones and l(lemens partners or
other joint O\vners' clairns were held defeated by the
intentional destruction by the co-insured. Appellant
has no quarrel with these cases; they simply do not help
in deciding ,,·hether appellant can recover for a loss
,,·here adtnittedly the o\vner could not. Tamiami holds
that mere negligence does not defeat the insured and
the An1erican Juris prudence citation concludes that
intentional burning by others does not ordinarily defeat
the action of the insured, \vhich is of course the position
plaintiff urges upon the Court.
R,espoialent cites three cases \vhich requtre 1nore
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careful analysis. U.S. 'Trust vs. ''rest Texas State Bank
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 272 S.,,r. 2d 627; and Southwestern Funding Corp. v. Motors Ins. Corp. (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 22 Cal. Reporter 781, both involve
construction of a clause in auton1obile policies restricting
coverage to accidents 'vhich occur "while the automobile
is in the United States." Both accidents occurred in
Mexico, and the place of destruction was held to place
the loss outside the coverage. There were standard loss
payable clauses in both cases and protection against
act or neglect of the owner was held not to give coverage
to the lienholder.
'rhis is treated like cyclone or windstorm, which has
to be covered by specific coverage. Theft by the owner
may also be guarded against. Arson is covered by the
fire coverage, and there is no other '"'ay provided by
the policy for the lienholder to have that coverage.
Travelers Insurance C.o. v. Springfield Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 8 Cir., 89 Fed. 2d 757, is cited
by Respondent at page 10. At page 761, of the report,
the Court held as to the standard loss payable clause
on the question of whether a requirement of payment
of premium \\"as binding on the mortgagee:
"Provisions of the policy '"hich are in conflict
'"ith provisions of the Inortgage clause or which
that clause indicates '"ere not intended to apply
to the Inortgaga!,Yould, of course, form no part
of the contract bet,Yeen the mortgagee and the
insurer. Prot·isions of the jJolicy rchich are clearly
intended to condition the insurance granted by
4
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/he i1untrer to both 1nortyagor and mortgagee
7oould forn~ a part of the contract of insurance
h'ilh the ntortyaycc as rcell as 1.cith the mortgagor.
It scen1s clear to us that the suspension clause
of the poliey in suit was such a provision. 'l.,he
poliey pr<n·ides that, if an installment of preIniunl is not paid "·hen due, the insurance shall
lapse until pay1nent is rnade, when it shall reYiYe." ( En1phasis supplied).
1\nd because the mortgagee also had it within his power
to extend the insurance, and failed to do so, he could
not coin plain at the result reached.
The loss payable clause here provides specifically
that no aet or neglect of the owner shall invalidate the
insurance or defeat recovery by the lienholder. Nothing
\vas expected of the mortgagee which was not done
and 'vhich related to the loss suffered. A plain reading
of the loss payable clause compels the conclusion that
the n1ortgagee 'viii not lose his claim by reason of any
act or neglect of the owner except as stated. Should
the loss result from conversion, embezzlement or secretion, a question 'vould be raised as to whether the
required coverage had been taken. As to loss by intentional fire, no doubt is suggested on the face of the
clause. Reference to the policy would be needed only
to determine the vehicle covered, the time of insurance,
and the types of coverage .
. .t\ ppellant argues in its brief (page 32) that the
exclusion of certain conduct of the insured fron1 coverage itnplies that other conduct of the insured is not
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excluded from coverage. Respondent takes issue with
this argument in its brief (pages 14 and 15).
The clause (Ex. 3) provides that this insurance
as to lienholder " ... shall not be invalidated by any act
of the . . . owner" nor by a change in ownership and
then excludes from this broad saving clause conversion,
embezzlement and secretion by the owner unless specifically insured against. That specific insurance is coverage G, the broad theft coverage.
If specifically insured against (under Coverage G)
there is no question of the lienholder's right to recover,
so that language about "act or neglect of the owner"
implies coverage as to conversion and embezzlement
without the specific coverage, requiring that the other
coverage be negatived. That other coverage, which must
be negatived, is Coverage D-comprehensive coverage
- direct and accidental loss which includes "theft."
Therefore, direct and accidental loss from theft by act
of the owner would be covered were it not for the exclusion. Respondent's argument ignores the fact that
Coverage D also covers theft and considers it a "direct
and accidental loss."
The analysis is as f ollo,vs: There are t'vo coverages
for "theft": Coverage D which is the comprehensive
and general, and Coverage G, "·hich is the specific broad
theft coverage. Theft coverage under D is implicit fron1
the need to exclude it by the "rords: "provided, however,
that the conversion, embezzlement or secretion by the
Lessee, mortgagor or Purchaser in possession of the

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property insured under a bailn1ent lease, conditional
sale. tnortgage or other encumbrance is not covered
under sueh poliey" and then the clause contemplates
('overage (; in Exhibit ~ by adding: "unless specifically
insured against and preinium paid therefor . . . "
There is no "broad fire" clause comparable to the
''broad theff' clause. If the premium is paid under
l.~oYerage 11\ there can be no recovery by the owner
for arson because the insured can't profit from his own
'\vrong, "·hich is all that respondent's cases on page 9
of its brief hold. But there is no special premium proYision to protect lienholder against owner's act of intentional burning~ and, therefore, the language of the loss
payable elause provides protection as it would for theft
if not specifically excluded. Arson is not excluded and
is, therefore, covered.
Respondent ignores other policy provisions in arguing that "direct and accidental'' has no application
to theft. Exclusion paragraph ( o) lumps together
('overages D and G as to theft or conversion by a
person in possession, although Coverage D calls it
direct and accidental loss and Coverage D doesn't say,
but both deal with theft.
And insuring Agreement l'"III povides broadly
that "'rhis policy applies only to accidents 'vhich occur
and to direct and accidental losses to the automobile."
"':-\.nd yet theft is covered t'vice and obviously involves an
intentional act.
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It thus appears plain from the policy itself that
theft loss is covered as to the owner when it is committed by a third person and is, therefore, direct and
accidental; but as to the lienholder there is protection
against intentional conversion or theft by the owner
only if the applicable premium under Coverage G has
been paid. We, therefore, reiterate our argument that
since the only exclusion from protection to the lienholder
under the loss payable clause against "act or neglect of
the owner" is from conversion and embezzlement (un·
less Coverage G is taken) by rule of interpretation
other intentional acts of the owner are insured against,
but recovery would be defeated if the lienholder were
implicated in the wrong.
Respondent's brief overlooks the further fact that
the phrase "direct and accidental" is a condition of the
policy between the owner and the insurer and is speaking from the point of view of those parties. If a stranger
to the policy and the automobile intentionally burned
the truck, recovery could be had by the owner under
the policy unless the owner was charged with complicity,
because as to the owner that would be accidental. Couch
on Insurance, Section 1157 says that the felonious act
of a third person is direct and accidental under the
standard loss payable clause. Warner vs. U.S. Mutual
Accident Association, 8 U. 431, 32 P. 696, states that
death by an assassin or burglar is "accidental" as to
deceased. Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 7 53, Insurance,
p. 777, says "accidental" is not a word "Tith technical
meaning· in the la,v, and is "an event which takes place
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\\'ithout the foresight or expectation of the person acted
011 or a fl'ected hy the event . . . ; unusual and not expeeted hy the person to \\·hom it happens." And 29A
~ \.tnerieall Juris prudence, p. 427, states that intentional
burning by others does not defeat the insured. Other
authorities are cited at page 28 of Appellant's brief.
See als<) Durbach v. ~.,idelity and Guaranty Co. (N.J.
Super. 85 1\. 2d 315, 316.
"fhe poliey itself indicates that intentional miscon ..
duet by an independent third party is direct and accidental so far as the insured is concerned. Coverage D
is for '"direct and accidental loss of or damage to the
auton1obile . . . except loss caused by collision . . . or
by upset ... lJreakage of glass and loss caused by ...
theft . . . shall not be deemed loss caused by collision
or upset.'' Theft implies the independent act of a third
party but is "direct and accidental" under this clause.
1:\nd like,vise, insofar as the lienholder is concerned,
the intentional destruction by fire without complicity of
the lienholder is a direct and accidental loss. Respondent
does not cite a single case or authority \vhich suggests
any different result.

POIXT II. I)IP AIR~IEN'l, OF SUBROGATIOX RIGHTS.
Respondent's argu1nent and authorities completley
ignore the facts that both the respondent and the Travelers Insurance (\). \vere in the same position of having
Ic,sses upon \\·hich the O\vner could make no recovery but
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the lienholder could and had equal rights against both
the insurance companies.
As one of the respondent's authorities, Zeiger vs.
Farmers and Laborers Co-op, 217 S.W. 2d, 426, says,
the rights of the parties in a situation like this are not
based upon the insurance policy, but upon the loss payable clause. That clause suggests no theory or basis
upon which U.S.F.&G. would have a right to go against
Travelers and be made whole, and no theory of subrogation to that end. 'fhe two insurance companies
stand as several obligors being bound equally to the
lienholder and having a complete defense against the
owner.
The conditions of the policy are not controlling,
but condition No. 20 plainly provides that where there
are two insurance policies, each will be bound for that
proportion of the loss which its coverage represents.
Both policies in this case covered the actual value of the
automobile; and, therefore, the risk of loss was equal
between them. Respondent has no basis for claim of
damage arising from the settlement with TraYelers.
That settlement eliminated one-half of any recovery
that might be made and permitted respondent to go
against the owner for any amount it paid the lienholder.
The fallacy of respondent's argument is indicated
by the quotation from 6 Apple1nan on Insurance, page
565, at pages 17 and 18 of its brief. That quotation
involves a situation "There a Inortgagor had taken out
two policies of fire coyerage one of 'vhich had been cancelled "Tithout the consent of the mortgagee, and had
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hrought an aetion to detertnine '"hich company should
pay the n1ortgagor. It contemplates also that one of
the insurers "·as liable to the mortgagor for the full
atnount of the loss and should, therefore, be required
to pay the tnortgagee to avoid circuity of action. In the
case before the court there is no company which has an
ohligation to the n1ortgagor, with clear liability as to
all or a part of the loss.
It is true that the clause provides that when the
company pays the lienholder and claims no liability to
the o"·ner, the company shall be subrogated to the
rights of the parties to 'vhom the payment is made,
\vhieh in this case 'vould be the lienholder plaintiff.
Plaintiff's right is to go equally against the two insurers
and to recover against either. A reasonable allocation
of that right is one-half to each, which is the theory of
the settlement made vlith Travelers. Both companies
had the same clause and the same right; and if each
company paid one-half of the loss, each would be subrogated to the right of the mortgagee, which "\Vas to
sue both companies. It is obvious that there was no
effective subrogation right in this case unless one of the
insurers paid the entire loss and then went against the
other insurer to require a sharing of the loss.
The cases cited at page 16 of respondent's brief
all involve situations 'vhere there were at least two
insurers, at least one of 'vhich 'vas bound to the owner
for the full an1ount of its policy, and each case also
involved one or 1nore con1panies bound to the lienholder
and not to the o'vner by reason of lapse, cancellation,
11
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or exclusion of the owner. The insurers were in different
positions of liability and the rights of subrogation,
therefore, became important since one company was
bound to the owner and the other \Vas not.
Respondent's brief is based on the assumption that
it had a right to come out of the case whole even if the
plaintiff had won as against both insurers. Such a claim
cannot be substantiated either from the loss payable
clauses or the authorities. The stipulation dismissing as
to Travelers was fair to the respondent, and the respondent had the same opportunity to get out of the case that
Travelers had, but chose instead to try to defeat the
claim of plaintiff on the issue of liability.
Respondent at page 17 quotes from 6 Appleman,
Insurance, Section 407 4, page 565 n. 64, a passage relating to an action by a mortgagor against two insurance
companies where the mortgagor had cancelled one policy
without consent of mortgagee and taken another policy.
The next page, 566, covers our situation where the
treatise states:
"Where a mortgagor took out a second policy
without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent,
the first insurer could not be subrogated against
the second co1npany, the judgment against both
insurers haYing apportioned the loss." Citing a
Texas case, Union Assur. Soc. v. Equitable
'Trust Co., CiY. App., 63 S.,V. 2d 869, aff'd 94
S.W. 2d 1151, 127 Tex. 618.
And the same treatise states that where there are
two insurers the liability is several, and if one pays the
entire loss it is entitled only to proportionate contribu-
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tiotl. pplernan, See. 4Bl3, pp.
cases eited in n. iO.
J. \

:~87,

388, with 1nany

Itespondent has the benefit of proportionate contribution "·ithout paying.
CONCLl~SION

Liability of respondent under the loss payable clause
is supported by:
lllain language of the clause protecting the lienholder against any act or neglect of the owner;
Construction of the clause which excludes conversion and embezzletnent unless specifically insured against
and prerniun1 paid, thus leaving intentional fire as a
covered risk;
~leaning

of direct and accidental which, as to lienholder, includes conduct of the owner not foreseen by
or chargeable to the lienholder.
'fhere 'vas no release of respondent by the settlenlent "·ith TraYelers "·hich accorded to U.S.F.&G. the
proportionate liability to "·hich it was entitled.
'fhe judgment should be reversed and the District
Court directed to enter judgment for the plaintiff for
~·) •)
'.-u,
.. .:J.. 0 •00 •

Respectfully submitted,
RICH.1-\.RDS ,BIRD AND HART
716 X e'vhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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